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Asbestosis Litigation: Prescription, Contribution, Exposure,
Insurance, and The Public Interest-A Casenote on Cole v.
Celotex Corp.
Cole v. Celotex Corp.' and Champagne v. Celotex Corp.2, two recent
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions, address the many issues present in the
litigation of asbestosis liability. In asbestos personal injury litigation, several
problems plague both litigants and the courts alike because of the long latency
period between the exposure and the manifestation of the injury. Cole and its
companion case, Champagne, offer answers to those problems.
These decisions do not, however, change the law; they represent a
clarification of the law. More precisely, these cases settle several important
issues of law prevalent in asbestosis litigation, which have been in conflict in the
federal and state courts since the advent of the asbestosis litigation crisis. 3 The
issues settled in Cole include: when prescription begins to run, whether the
doctrine of contributory negligence or comparative fault governs, when the actual
injury occurs in an exposure case, and which insurance policies are available to
the insureds.
Perhaps the only drawback to the court's decisions regarding asbestosis is
that they make it significantly easier for consumers of tobacco products who
have developed cancer to sue the manufacturers of those products. The adoption
of the exposure theory4 as the time at which the actual injury occurs allows
smokers to reach beyond the Louisiana Products Liability Act to the protection
of Halphenv. Johns-ManvilleCorp.'s "unreasonably dangerous per se" standard
of liability.' This is not to suggest that the decisions are incorrect, but rather,
to demonstrate the difficulty in applying jurisprudential tort law to long latency
exposure injuries. Nonetheless, while there are strong arguments favoring
government regulation of asbestos cases as opposed to judicial resolution, the
decisions in Cole and Champagne are the best that a judicial body can do
without statutory guidance.
The plaintiffs in Cole were three men who sustained lung damage from
long-term exposure to asbestos while employed by Cities Service at its refinery
in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. The plaintiffs filed suit against the asbestos
manufacturers, the executive officers of Cities Service at the time of their
exposure, and the Insurance Company of North America (INA), the liability

Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992).
2. 599 So. 2d 1086 (La. 1992).
3. The crisis label has evolved due to the enormous number of asbestosis cases filed across
the country.
4. The exposure theory is one of several theories which designate at which point in time a
person was injured and, thus, when a cause of action arises. Under the exposure theory, the initial
exposure to the harmful substance is deemed to be the time that the injury occurs.
5. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
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insurer of the named executive officers. The plaintiffs alleged that the officers
had failed to provide them with a safe work environment from the time the
plaintiffs began to work in 1945 until 1976. During those years, suits against
executive officers were barred by the workers' compensation provisions.6
On the eve of the trial, the plaintiffs settled their products liability action
against the manufacturers, leaving INA and the executive officers as defendants.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found nine of the eleven named executive
officers negligent and awarded the plaintiffs $300,000 each. It determined that
the executive officers were ninety-five percent at fault and the manufacturers five
percent at fault. The result was a final award of $285,000 to each plaintiff. In
addition, the trial judge found that INA provided coverage to the executives
during their period of negligence, a decision that effectively forced the insurer
to pay the entire judgment.
On appeal, the third circuit affirmed the judgment on the issues of the
executives' negligence and the coverage of INA. However, the court amended
the decision because it found that pre-comparative fault law applied both to the
plaintiffs' direct claim and to the apportionment of liability among the
defendants. The holding that pre-comparative fault law applied to the plaintiffs'
direct claim had no effect in this case because the plaintiffs were not
contributorily negligent. However, the ruling was significant as to the
apportionment of liability among the defendants because under pre-comparative
fault principles, the apportionment of fault was determined by prorating the
defendants' virile shares. 7 Pro rata sharing, coupled with the pretrial stipulation
that the manufacturers were negligent, caused the appellate court to reduce the
award against INA by the number of shares of the eleven settled manufacturers.
The court's holding that pre-comparative fault principles govern essentially
means that the right to contribution between joint tortfeasors arises at the time
of the tort, not upon judicial demand.8
In explaining its holding that INA provided coverage for the executive
officers, the court specifically adopted the exposure theory as the "trigger of
coverage."9 According to this theory, the injury producing the right to
compensation occurs when the injured party first inhales the asbestos fibers, even
though the damage is not detectable until many years later. To complement the
acceptance of the exposure theory, the third circuit affirmed the trial court's
allowance of horizontal "stacking" of the annual insurance policies issued by

6. 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 2 (codified at La. R.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1992)) (eliminating the
employee's right to sue his employer or officers of the employer for negligence, in exchange for
protection under the workers' compensation laws).
7. See former La. Civ. Code art. 2103 (1961) (As between the solidary debtors, each is liable
only for his virile portion of the obligation.); Ferdinand F. Stone, Torts § 111, in 12 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (1977) (defining virile share as per capita sharing of the debt).
8. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 588 So. 2d 376, 384-85 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991), affd, 599 So. 2d
1058 (1992).
9. Id. at 390.
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INA over the years covering the plaintiffs' exposures.1 ° Horizontal "stacking"
allowed the plaintiffs to combine any insurance policies in effect when they were
exposed to asbestos so that they, the injured parties, were fully compensated."
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Hall,
accepted all aspects of the third circuit court of appeal's decision and provided
additional authorities to support the appellate court's holding. This note proposes
that asbestos personal injury cases should not be a matter of judge made tort law.
For the sake of the public interest, asbestosis cases warrant some form of
legislative regulation; however, the judiciary "does not have the luxury of
adjudicating cases on the theory that the legislature will at some point enact
protective legislation," and in the absence of such regulation, "a court is
responsible for the outcome of the cases before it."' 2
The principles on which the holdings in Cole and Champagne are based
demonstrate that the Louisiana Supreme Court has done its best within its vested
powers, bearing in mind, as one commentator has stated, that "[a] judicial
solution may not be the best solution, but it is often a court's fate to provide
second best solutions."'' 3 The result is that Louisiana courts and federal courts
applying Louisiana law to asbestosis cases now have a definitive statement to
guide them as they attempt to address the numerous asbestos personal injury
cases presently filling court dockets. This note clarifies and provides additional
reasoning for the principles established in Cole and Champagne, which may
prove valuable for the practitioner. Additionally, this note explains why we are
left with the wrong conclusion, although the court gave all the right reasons.
I. PRESCRIPTION IN LONG TERM LATENCY DISEASE LITIGATION

The facts giving rise to most asbestos personal injury suits do not resemble
those of the typical tort suit. Most asbestosis suits usually involve a temporal
separation between the exposure to the hazard and the appearance of the injury,

10. Id. To "stack" insurance policies is to allow the insured to collect and pool all available
policies in order to more fully compensate him for his loss.
11. There were several other issues raised and decided in Cole and Champagne; however, they
are not concerned with asbestos litigation and are, therefore, not within the scope of this note. They
include 1) whether the defendants could reduce the amount of the plaintiffs' recovery based upon the
plaintiffs' pretrial settlements with the manufacturer-defendants since no evidence of such settlements
was presented at trial (The supreme court held that no evidence was necessary in light of the parties'
stipulation to the manufacturers' fault.); 2) whether pre-judgment interest should run from the date
the plaintiffs filed suit in the present case in state court or from the date of the original filing in
federal court, which was dismissed (The supreme court held that interest runs from the filing in state
court because legal interest is statutory and must be strictly construed.); and 3) whether certain
medical records fell within the business records exception to the hearsay rule (The supreme court held
that the medical records were within the exception because a proper foundation was laid.).
12. Note, Adjudicating Asbestos Insurance Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 739, 757 (1984) [hereinafter Adjudicating Asbestos Insurance Liability].
13. Id.
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normally ranging from ten to twenty-five years.' 4 Problems with prescription
in such situations are inevitable. In contrast, there is no problem in ascertaining
the exact date that prescription begins to accrue in a typical personal injury
setting because usually a certain event occurs that clearly causes the injury,
provides notice to the person that he has been injured, and thereby, starts the
running of prescription. In asbestosis litigation, because of the continuing nature
of the disease and the length of time between the tortious conduct and the
manifestation of the disease, issues involving prescription are complex. The vast
majority of persons who suffer from asbestos related injuries would, if normal
tort principles were applied, lose their right to compensation for the injuries
before they ever knew they had the right. The inequity of such a result has
prompted courts across the nation to adopt several judicial exceptions in order
to interrupt prescription. 5
Although the court in Cole explained many important issues with great
clarity, it did not address the issue of prescription. Nevertheless, by its silence,
the supreme court affirmed the application of the most popular of the equitable
creations-the "discovery" rule.
Under the "discovery" rule in common law states, the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the injured party learns or should have learned of his
or her injury. 1 6 Applied to asbestosis litigation, "the cause of action accrues
when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of an injury and also knows
or reasonably should know that the injury was caused by the wrongful acts of
another."' 7 This rule is the most equitable because it avoids prescriptive rules
that under other theories operate to extinguish a plaintiff's action. For8 this
reason, many state and federal courts have adopted the "discovery" rule.'

14. Barbara Wrubel, Comment, Liability Insurancefor InsidiousDiseases: Who Picks Up The
Tab?, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 657 (1980).
15. Grimes v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 843 F.2d 815 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub
nora. Celotex Corp. v. Grimes, 488 U.S. 889, 109 S. Ct. 221 (1988); Cowgill v. Raymark Indus., Inc.,
832 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1987) (representing adoption of the discovery rule); Clutter v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that the statute of limitations begins to run at
manifestation of the disease); In re E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litigation, 772 F. Supp 1380 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991); Miller v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 817 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1991); Locke v. JohnsManville Corp., 275 S.E.2d 900 (Va. 1981) (holding that the statute of limitations begins to run when
the plaintiff is injured as determined by medical evidence, a branch of the discovery rule).
16. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869, 95 S.Ct. 127 (1974).
17. Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 421 N.E.2d 864, 868 (I11.
1981).
18. See H. Ward Classen, An Investigation into the Statute of Limitations and Product
Identification in Asbestos Litigation, 30 How. L.J. 1, 17 n.99 (1987) (citing Strickland v. JohnsManville Int'l Corp., 461 F. Supp 215 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (applying Texas law in an asbestosis case);
Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 3d 881, 159 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1979)
(asbestosis case); Miller v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 460 P.2d 535 (Kan. 1969) (emphysema and
pulmonary fibrosis case); Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 394 P.2d 299 (1978).
See also Francis E.McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in
ProductLiability Actions: Present and Future, 16 Forum 416, 422-23 (1981). More recently, see

19931

NOTES

Finding equity in the "discovery" rule, courts across the country have moved
away from the harsher "traditional" rule under which prescription begins to
accrue when the plaintiff experiences an injury.19 In light of the court's holding
in Cole that repeated exposures to asbestos constitute a compensable injury,
application of the "traditional" rule in Louisiana would deprive injured workers
of compensation because prescription would run long before the disease
manifested itself.
There have been several other, albeit less popular, methods of addressing
prescription in long-term latency disease cases. One such method suspends
prescription until the plaintiff suffers an injury as determined with reasonable
certainty by medical evidence. 20 Depending on the circumstances, prescription
could start to accrue from the time of the initial exposure, the discovery of the
injury, or somewhere in between.2 Again, the court's adoption in Cole of the
exposure theory as the time that the injury occurs could result in nothing more
than the application of the "traditional" prescription rule.
Nonetheless, the "discovery" rule is already part of Louisiana's civilian
tradition through the maxim contra non valentem agere nulla currit
22
praescriptio.
Contra non valentem "designates the suspension of prescription
due to the inability of the party against whom it would ordinarily run to bring
an action to interrupt it. '23 Recognition of this doctrine in Louisiana dates at
least as far back as 1817, when the Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged it
in Quierry's Executor v. Faussier'sExecutors.24 As a principle of equity and
natural justice, contra non valentem is treated with the same respect and weight
as written law 25 and at one time "was applied so extensively ... that it
threatened to make of prescription the exception rather than the rule. ' 26 Except
for a short-lived period in the late 1860's, in which Louisiana courts abolished
contra non valentem as conflicting with the principles of our code,27 the
doctrine has consistently been28recognized by Louisiana courts, albeit less
frequently in more recent years.

Cowgill v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1987); Miller v. Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc., 817 P.2d I11 (Colo. 1991).
19. In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. III. 1981).
20. Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 275 S.E.2d 900 (Va. 1981).
21.
Classen, supra note 18, at 1.
22. Prescription does not run against a party unable to act. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d
305,.307 n.4 (La. 1986).
23. Allain D. Favrot, Comment, The Scope of the Maxim Contra Non Valentem in Louisiana,
12 Tul. L. Rev. 244 (1938).
24. 4 Mart. (o.s.) 609 (La. 1817).
25. Favrot, supra note 23, at 246.
26. Id. at 244.
27. See Smith v. Stewart, 21 La. Ann. 67 (1869).
28. See also La. Civ. Code art. 3467 cmt. d, which acknowledges the existence of contra nonl
valentem.
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As explained by the supreme court, contra non valentem is "a judicially
created exception to the general rule of prescription ' 29 and applies in four
situations:
1) Where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or
their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiffs
action;
2) Where there was some condition coupled with a contract or
connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing
or acting;
3) Where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent
the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action;
4) Where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by
the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by the defendant.30
The "discovery" rule sits neatly within the folds of the last application listed
by the court in which the plaintiff does not or cannot know of his cause of
action. This fourth category, formulated by Justice Tate, 3' provides that so long
as the disease is dormant, the exposed party, through no fault of his own, is
prevented from enforcing his cause of action. Thus, equity requires, by way of
the "discovery" rule inherent in the maxim contranon valenten, that prescription
be suspended.
However, it may not be that simple. What happens to the patient who,
through the negligence of his doctor, leaves the operating table with a sponge in
his abdomen that is not discovered for three years, at which time the patient dies
of infection? Will not the maxim contra non valentem and the "discovery" rule
prevent the running of prescription until the patient knows or should have known
of the doctor's malpractice? For actions occurring after the effective date of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5628,32 the patient has no recourse because the
legislature, in reacting to the rapidly growing number of medical malpractice
cases, made a policy decision. Under this statute, medical malpractice claims are
barred after one year from the act or knowledge of the act, but at the latest three

29. Rajnowski v. St. Patrick's Hosp., 564 So. 2d 671, 674 (La. 1990).
30. Corsey v. State Dep't of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319, 1321-22 (La. 1979).
31. Id. at 1322.
32. La. R.S. 9:5628 (1991) provides:
No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, chiropractor, dentist,
psychologist, hospital duly licensed under the laws of this state ...,whether based upon
tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless
filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect, or within one
year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission or neglect; however, even as
to claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims
shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act,
omission, or neglect.
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years from the date of the act whether the injured party has knowledge or not.
It would appear that the passage of the statute demonstrates a situation in which
the public interest as a whole outweighed the interests of the injured patients.
In the eyes of the legislature, equity apparently required saving a profession and
its insurers from their own negligence in order to protect the public in the end.
The problems in asbestosis litigation represent a similar situation. Presently there
are over 130,000 asbestosis cases pending in courts across the country,33
including over 65,000 filings against one manufacturer' and fourteen former
manufacturers of asbestos in bankruptcy.35
In dealing with this mass of litigation, at least one other state has turned to
prescription as a tool for limiting access to the courts. In Illinois, the legislature
passed, as part of their workers' compensation law, a restrictive prescriptive
provision which applies to occupational diseases, including asbestosis. Illinois
Compiled Statute, chapter 820, act 310, section l(f) provides:
No compensation shall be payable for or on account of any occupational
disease unless disablement, as herein defined, occurs within two years
after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease,
except in cases of occupational disease caused by berylliosis or by the
inhalation of silica dust or asbestos dust and, in such cases, within 3
years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of such
disease ....

36

The limitation employed in Illinois seems especially harsh given that the average
time span between initial exposure and clinical evidence is seventeen years.37
Nonetheless, the Illinois statute is one example that illustrates the difficulties
inherent in applying tort law to asbestosis problems. More importantly, by
placing a limitations period on the time in which a person may bring an
asbestosis action, whether the person has knowledge of his injury or not, this
statute demonstrates that this is one area in which the public interest can
outweigh the interests of the individual plaintiffs, and that prescription can serve
as the method to achieve some form of regulation.

33. Richard A. Solomon, Clearing the Air: Resolving the Asbestos Personal Injury Litigation
Crisis, 2 Fordham Envtl. L. Rep. 125 (1991).
34.

Barbara A. Wetzel, Asbestos In the Work Place: What Every Employee Should Know, 31

Santa Clara L. Rev. 423, 432 n.62 (1991).
35. Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation,
15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 541, 555 n.56 (1992) (The list includes Johns-Manville, Raymark, EaglePicher, H.K. Porter, Celotex, Carey Canada, Forty Eight Insulations, Unarco, Nicolet, Amatex,
Huxley, Pacor, Standard Asbestos, and D.I. Distributors).
36. 820 ILCS 310/1, § l(f) (Smith-Hurd Ann. 1993).
37.

(1980).

Christopher C. Mansfield, Asbestos: The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15 Forum 860
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II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR COMPARATIVE FAULT

Because the latency period in the development of asbestosis is so long, the
accrual of a normal cause of action for the contraction of the disease will often
span several changes in the law. As a result, the courts are presented with
numerous problems in deciding which law to apply.
The major development in the law applicable to Cole and Champagne was
the passage of Act 431 of 1979." 8 Effective August 1, 1980, Act 431 represented a major change in Louisiana law with its adoption of comparative fault. Prior
to this act, contributory negligence barred a plaintiff's recovery,3 9 and pro rata
virile share principles controlled defendants' rights among themselves.40 Such
a bar is inequitable in cases involving a plaintiff whose negligence was minimal.
In response to this inequity, Act 431 replaced contributory negligence with
comparative fault. Under comparative fault principles, a plaintiff found to be
partially responsible for his injuries will not lose his right of recovery, rather, 4any
judgment awarded will be reduced in proportion to his percentage of fault. '
Prior to Act 431, pro rata virile share principles governed the rights between
joint tortfeasors. Under the prior law, each liable party was counted as an
individual share, and the damage awards were divided equally between the
number of shares. 42 Thus, a defendant only minimally at fault was responsible
for the same amount of damages as the primary tortfeasor. To correct this

38. La. Civ. Code art. 2323 provides:
When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages, its effect shall be as
follows: If aperson suffers injury, death or loss as the result partly of his own negligence
and partly as a result of the fault of another person or persons, the claim for damages
shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in
proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering
the injury, death or loss.
39. Former La. Civ. Code art. 2323 (1825) read: "The damage caused is not always estimated
at the exact value of the thing destroyed or injured; it may be reduced according to circumstances,
if the owner of the thing has exposed it imprudently." See Crum v. Holloway Gravel Co., 273 So.
2d 566 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 1276 So. 2d 701 (1973); Williams v. J. B. Levert Land Co.,
162 So. 2d 53 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 245 La. 1081, 162 So. 2d 574 (1964).
40. Former La. Civ. Code art. 2103 read:
When two or more debtors are liable in solido, whether the obligation arises from a
contract, a quasi contract, an offense, or a quasi offense, it should be divided between
them. As between the solidary debtors, each is liable only for his virile portion of the
obligation.
A defendant who is sued on an obligation which, if it exists, is solidary may seek to
enforce contribution, if he is cast, against his solidary co-debtor by making him a third
party defendant in the suit, as provided in Article[s] 1111 through 1116 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, whether or not the third party defendant was sued by the plaintiff
initially, and whether the defendant seeking to enforce contribution if he is cast admits or
denies liability on the obligation sued on by the plaintiff.
41.
See supra note 38 for the text of La. Civ. Code art. 2323.
42. See supra note 40.

1993]

NOTES

inequity, the legislature passed Act 431 providing that
joint tortfeasors are liable
43
among themselves only in proportion to their fault.
The exposures giving rise to the causes of action in both Cole and
Champagne occurred prior to the passage of Act 431. However, the court was
not presented with this issue with regard to the plaintiffs' causes of action
because Act 431 specifically provides that "[tihe provisions of this act shall not
apply to claims arising from events that occurred prior to the time this act
becomes effective.""
The "events" are the "repeated tortious exposures
resulting in continuous, on-going damages"4' that occurred prior to the effective
date of the statute." Moreover, in this instance, as in most asbestosis cases in
which the plaintiff employee is injured while in the work environment, the
plaintiffs were found free of fault.47 So while the application of pre-Act
contributory negligence can be significant, it is not likely to have much effect on
a plaintiff's action for personal injury due to asbestos.
The more troublesome issue involved a determination of which law defined
the defendants' rights among each other. At the time of trial in Champagne,
several manufacturers remained, while in Cole, there was only one potentially
liable defendant remaining when trial began. Nonetheless, in Cole, INA wished
to reduce its liability through contribution based on the virile shares of the eleven
manufacturers that had previously settled. Thus, this argument was vigorously
argued in both Cole and Champagne. In view of the change in Act 431, the
specific issue was when the right of contribution between joint tortfeasors arises.
If the right does not vest until judicial demand is made upon a defendant, then
comparative fault principles apply. If however, as the supreme court held, the
right becomes vested at the time of the harm, then pre-Act pro rata virile share
principles apply. The latter application and holding best comport with the theory
of contribution.
Contribution is "an attempt to redistribute the common burden among those
who have contributed to that burden. 49 Originally, the injured party was "the
lord of his action, ' and joint tortfeasors were not afforded any recourse
against one another during litigation. The supreme court held that the negligent

43. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1804, 1805.
44.
1979 La. Acts No. 431, § 4.
45. James L. Dennis, Problems in the Toxic Tort Case: Delayed Injury and Future Injury
(1992) (outline of apresentation), cited in Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1066 (La. 1992).
46. The plaintiffs in both Cole and Champagne alleged that the exposures to asbestos began
in 1945, when they first became employed. The exposures were alleged to have occurred up to the
filing of the suits.
47. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 588 So. 2d 376, 384 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991), affd, 599 So.2d 1058
(1992).
48. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992); Champagne v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.
2d 1086 (La. 1992) (see generally the arguments posed by all parties related to contribution).
49. Patrick J.Farrelly, Jr., Comment, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors in
Louisiana, 5 Loy. L. Rev. 151, 152 (1950).
50. Id. at 151.
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act provided no liability between the tortfeasors,"5' and courts refused to provide
a joint tortfeasor with an action to include his fellow tortfeasor in the suit.52
Decisions such as these left the tortfeasors' liability solely in the hands of the
injured party. The injured plaintiff was free to decide which of several obligors
to sue, a decision that rendered the obligor liable without any recourse against
the other tortfeasor until after judgment.
Such applications completely
disregarded the principles of Louisiana Civil Code articles 2103 and 2324, which,
to at least one commentator, were included in the Civil Code "to grant a
substantive right of contribution to a solidary debtor such
as the joint tortfeasor
53
who pays more than his part and portion of the debt."
The courts continued to disfavor contribution despite legislative action54
designed to remove this power from the whim of the plaintiff.55 During the late
1950s, a jurisprudential rule evolved that the right to contribution arose not at the
commission of the delictual act, but rather when joint tortfeasors were cast in
judgment in solido. Furthermore, a cause of action did not vest until one
56
defendant paid the entire judgment.
In direct response to this evolving rule, the legislature again amended Civil
Code article 2103 in 1960,57 and this time it specifically provided that "[a]s
between the solidary debtors, each is liable only for his virile portion of the
obligation. 5 1 Moreover, the amendment made available third-party practice to
defendants,59 which illustrated the legislature's intent to provide joint tortfeasors
a right of action against each other at the commission of the tort.
This historical view of contribution provides authority for the court's
conclusions in both Cole and Champagne that at the commission of the tort,
there arises one cause of action and two rights of action. The plaintiff is
provided a cause of action and a right of action in tort, and the joint tortfeasors
share a right of action between themselves for contribution.
Additionally, the holding respects the well-recognized civilian principle of
subrogation, the source of contribution.' Subrogation, as provided in Article
1829 of the Louisiana Civil Code, occurs by operation of law "[i]n favor of an

51. Sincer v. Bell, 47 La. Ann. 1548, 18 So. 755 (1895).
52. Rumpf v. Callo, 16 La. App. 12, 132 So. 763 (Orl. 1931).
53. Leon L. Mclntire, Contribution Among JointTortfeasors: Louisiana's Past,Present, and
Future,37 Tul. L. Rev. 525, 527 (1963).
54. 1954 La. Acts No. 433, La. Civ. Code art. 2103 (repealed).
55. Kahn v. Urania Lumber Co., 103 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
56. Mclntire, supra note 53, at 528.
57. 1960 La. Acts No. 30, § 1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Lebleu v. Southern Silica, 554 So. 2d 852, 854 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989), writs denied,559
So. 2d 489, 559 So. 2d 490, 559 So. 2d 491 (1990). See alsoThompson v. Cane Garden Apts., 480
So. 2d 373 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Sellers v. Seligman, 463 So. 2d 697 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 464 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1985); Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964); Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933).
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obligor who pays a debt he owes with others or for others and who has recourse
against those others as a result of the payment.""
Plainly stated, the joint
tortfeasor is subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff and can have no more rights
than the injured party.62 Thus, when the plaintiff's cause of action arises at the
time of the tort, by operation of law the right to contribution also arises between
the responsible parties.
As illustrated by Justice Hall,63 the confusion in the lower courts over when
the right to seek contribution arises stems from a misreading of the decision in
Brown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co." In Brown, the Louisiana Supreme
Court stated that "it is only after judicial demand has been made on one of two
or more solidarily obligated tort feasors [sic] that he can have any possible
interest in seeking contribution. ' '65 This language was read in Lanier v. T. L.
James & Co.66 to mean that the right to contribution arose at judicial demand
rather than at the commission of the tort. However, this reading is incorrect.
Contribution has its origin in subrogation which occurs by operation of law
irrespective of when judicial demand is made. Thus, it appears that the view
enunciated in Cole and Champagne is correct.
So, where do defendants embroiled in asbestosis litigation now stand in
Louisiana? With the adoption of the far-reaching exposure theory as the time the
injury gives rise to a plaintiffs right of action, it is likely that most asbestos
personal injury actions will be deemed to have vested prior to the effective date
of Act 431. The result is that the cases will not be decided using comparative
fault principles. Rather, the typical plaintiffs action will now be deemed to have
arisen long before the effective date of the change in the law, and through
contribution by way of subrogation, so will the defendants' rights. The result
should be that courts will apply pro rata virile share principles between joint
tortfeasors.
III. ADOPTION OF THE EXPOSURE THEORY
Perhaps the most significant of the several issues decided in Cole and Champagne is the adoption of the exposure theory. Typically, the exposure theory is
67
used to determine the time at which an insurer is bound to provide coverage.

61. See La. Civ. Code art. 1829.
62. Perkins v. Scaffolding Rental & Erection Serv., 568 So. 2d 549 (La. 1990).
63. See generally Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992); Champagne v. Celotex
Corp., 599 So. 2d 1086 (La.1992).
64. 243 La. 271, 142 So. 2d 796 (1962).
65. Id. at 276, 142 So.2d at 798.
66. 148 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
67. Terry A. H. Senne, Insurance Law-Products Liability Insurance- Time of Exposure
Triggers Coverage for Asbestos-Related Diseases, 26 Wayne L. Rev. 1127 (1980); Porter v.
American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109, 102 S.Ct 686 (1981);
Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). clarified,
657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
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However, the Louisiana Supreme Court went beyond the insurance language and
adopted the exposure theory as the time at which an injured party's right of
action vests: "We conclude that the key relevant events giving rise to a claim
in long-latency occupational disease cases are the repeated tortious exposures
resulting in continuous, on-going damages, although the disease may not be
considered contracted or manifested until later." To understand the impact of
this language, one first must understand the principles behind the exposure
theory.
Determining at what point an insurer of a manufacturer becomes obligated
to provide coverage to the manufacturer's employees who have been injured due
to asbestos exposure is another problem in applying tort law principles to
asbestos personal injury litigation. Courts across the country have been split on
this issue ev~r since the Fifth Circuit defined the liability of asbestos manufacturers in the landmark case of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. 69
In dealing with this unique problem, the courts have adopted three separate
theories: 70 the exposure theory, in which coverage is triggered upon the initial
exposure; the manifestation theory, in which coverage results when the disease
becomes apparent; and the triple-triggertheory, 71 in which coverage is activated
by manifestation, initial exposure, as well as continuing exposure. 72 Commentary analyzing each theory is extensive, yet many courts remain in conflict.
Several characteristics of these theories, however, are settled. With near
unanimity, insurers favor the manifestation theory and plaintiffs prefer the
exposure theory. The exposure theory appears to be the better option in light of
the reasons provided by the supreme court in Cole.
The Louisiana Supreme Court provided three reasons in support of its
holding that the exposure theory applies in Louisiana. The first is that such an
application "best comports with a literal construction of 'bodily injury,' '.. as

68. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1066 (La. 1992).
69. 493 F.2d 1076, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973).
70. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1028, 103 S. Ct. 1279 (1983) (manifestation theory); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co.
of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982)
(triple trigger theory); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1109, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981) (exposure theory).
71. The triple trigger theory, as propounded in Keene, 667 F.2d 1034, establishes that there is
no certain trigger of coverage, but rather insurance coverage can be triggered at any point from
exposure through manifestation. As of now, this concept has not been followed with any regularity.
Although this theory does seem to maximize coverage, courts have generally followed either the
exposure or the manifestation theory. One reason why the courts may not be following Keene is that
the triple trigger theory provided coverage for the manufacturer who was uninsured. Allowing
coverage in this manner would discourage manufacturers from adequately researching and insuring
their products. Pamela J. Layton, Manifestation: The Least Defensible Insurance Coverage Theory
for Asbestos-Related Disease Suits, 7 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 167, 178-79 (1983).
72. Gail B. Agrawal, Comment, Asbestosis: Who Will Pay the Plaintiff?, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1491,
1498 (1983).
73. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1076 (La. 1992).
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used in the insurance contracts. The commercial general liability contracts at
issue in Cole and Champagne were standard form contracts, which at the time
were used across the country and generally provided that the insurer would pay
"all sums which the insured shall be legally obligated to pay as damages because
'
of ... bodily injury . . .caused by an occurrence."74

The ambiguity of the

terms "bodily injury" and "occurrence" is the root of the problem. Construed
literally, however, there is no problem with finding that exposure is equivalent
to injury in light of medical evidence"-universal in agreement 76-that tissue
damage begins shortly after the inhalation of asbestos fibers. 7" The damaging
process was described by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:78
Once in the lung, the particles cannot be coughed out and remain there
permanently. The noxious effect of these rock particles causes the body
to set up an inflammation until eventually fibrosis occurs. Through
fibrosis the body lays down scar tissue in the lung surrounding the
asbestos fibers. With a large concentration of the fibers lodged in the
lung cavities, scar tissue eventually replaces most of the healthy lung
tissue . . .9

Despite the medical consensus that exposure produces injury, it is this aspect
of the exposure theory that advocates of a manifestation theory choose to attack.
The tenor of such contrary arguments is that exposure is only a predicate to the
eventual injury,80 and that the injury is not "compensable" until the disease
manifests itself.5 ' This line of reasoning was refuted by the Sixth Circuit:
The manufacturer here paid for protection from bodily injury resulting
in liability. It should make no difference when the bodily injury
happens to become compensable. Put another way, we see nothing in
the policy which requires that the underlying plaintiffs' cause of action
accrue within the policy period. There exists a clear distinction between
when bodily injury occurs and when the bodily injury which has
occurred becomes compensable.82

74. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1216 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 45 U.S. 1109, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
75. Irving J. Selikoff et al., Asbestos Exposure, Smoking and Neoplasia, J.A.M.A., April 8,
1968, at 106; Irving J. Selikoff and Douglas H.K. Lee, Asbestos and Disease (1978).
76. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 633 F.2d at 1218.
77. Id. at 1217.
78. Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co. v. Porter, 454 U.S. 1109, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
79. Id. at 1133.
80. Agrawal, supra note 72, at 1502.
81. See generally appellants' arguments in Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
82. Id. at 1223.
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This reasoning seems to better reflect the intent of the parties. It would be
illogical to argue that the insured paid premiums only intending to cover thoseinjuries sustained and manifested during the existence of the policy. Surely the
insured intended to cover any liability which might arise from injuries sustained
during the policy period, whether they manifest themselves during that time or
not.
A plaintiff will not likely receive a favorable judgment prior to manifestation
because he will not be able to prove damages."3 Thus, perhaps Justice Hall's
reasoning as applied to the issue of contribution rights between joint tortfeasors
could dispose of this issue as well. In effect, an asbestosis plaintiff's cause of
action would vest at the time of exposure, but would become actionable only
upon manifestation.
The second reason given for the acceptance of the exposure theory is
premised on*the theory of contraproferentum through which insurance coverage
is maximized."4 If the manifestation rule is accepted, the insurance companies
that provide insurance to the manufacturer during the exposure, but that are not
insuring the manufacturer at the time of the manifestation, will escape liability.
Moreover, manufacturers eventually would be unable to secure insurance because
insurers today either refuse to provide such coverage or provide such coverage
only subject to prohibitive deductibles." Today most insurance policies contain
an "asbestos exclusion clause," and when such insurance is available, the
premiums are oppressive. 6 In 1985, premiums rose to 9.1 billion dollars-a
sixty percent increase from 1983.7 In contrast, the exposure theory would
provide coverage for every year
in which the manufacturer "[was] conscientious
8
enough to obtain insurance.', 1
Perhaps the best illustration of the desire to afford the maximum amount of
coverage to injured parties is found in one commentator's analysis of the
decision in Eagle-PitcherIndustries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,8 9 a case that adopted the manifestation approach. 90 The author points out

83. This statement is strictly limited to a cause of action based on contraction of asbestosis or
a related disease. Manufacturers may still be liable for an action based on a fear of cancer. For a
general discussion of this recent type of action, see Dennis, supra note 45. See also Devlin v. Johns
Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super L. 1985); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257
(N.J. 1989).
84. Contra proferentuin is used in connection with the construction of written documents. The
effect of this theory is that an ambiguous provision in such a document is construed most strongly
against the person who selected the language. In virtually every asbestos personal injury case, the
insurance contracts were written by the insurance companies.
85. Layton, supra note 71, at 181.
86. Patrick J. Hagan et al., Totalling Up the Costs ofAsbestos Litigation: Guess Who Will Pay
the Price?, 9 Temp. Envtl. L. Tech. J. 1 (1990).
87. Id.
88. Layton, supra note 71.
89. 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028, 103 S. Ct. 1279 (1983).
90. Agrawal, supra note 72, at 1505.
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the possible basis for the court's conclusion that the manifestation theory
expressed the true intent of the parties. The article discloses the underlying fact
that the manufacturer being sued was uninsured throughout most of the plaintiffs'
exposure period. Thus, faced with a choice that would likely have left the
injured plaintiffs uncompensated given the financial condition of the corporation,
the court chose to refute the exposure theory.91 The effect of adopting the
manifestation theory on the availability of insurance to manufacturers and the
resultant likelihood of uncompensated plaintiffs seem to92insure that the exposure
theory will provide the maximum amount of coverage.
The final reason given by the court to support adoption of the exposure
theory is that application of the theory "honors the contracting parties' intent by
providing for consistency between the insured's tort liability and the insurer's
coverage . . ,,93 In the words of one commentator, "Since the manufacturer's
liability is based on the worker's exposure, the parties must have intended their
insurance coverage to mirror the manufacturer's liability." 94
However, adoption of the exposure theory does more than trigger insurance
coverage. It establishes a specific point in time at which a person was injured,
thereby forcing courts to apply the substantive law as it applied at the time of the
injury. In light of Louisiana's liberal products liability history, the exposure
theory allows plaintiffs to escape the conservative Products Liability Act and
instead grants them access to the generous pre-Act jurisprudence.
Although Champagne is the companion case to Cole, a major factual
difference distinguishes the two cases. At the time of the trials, Cole was a suit
in negligence against the executive officers of the corporation, while Champagne
was a products liability action against the manufacturers themselves.95 This
distinction is important because when the court designated the repeated exposures
as the acts giving rise to the injured parties claims, it effectively placed longterm exposure suits against the manufacturers back into the coverage of Halphen

91. Id. at 1507.
92. For a general overview of the effect that asbestos litigation has had and its likely future
effects on the insurance industry, see Alvin L. Arnold, Insurance: Asbestos Claims Covered Under
Liability Policy, 23 Real Estate Law Report 1 (1992); Stephen F. English & Madeleine S. Campbell,
Self hIsurersand Risk Managers: Case Comment on California Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases,
24 Tort and Ins. L.J. 505 (1989); David Worthen, Asbestos Abatement (The Insurance Crisis): A
Solution Is Still Up In the Ambient Air, 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 1343 (1987); and Adjudicating Asbestos
Insurance Liability, supra note 12.
93. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1077 (La. 1992).
94. Agrawal, supra note 72, at 1507.
95. There were numerous manufacturing defendants in each case. However, the only
manufacturers at trial were those named in the Champagne case. The application granted by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in 'Champagne was prepared by the GAF Corporation and the Quigley
Company.
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v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.% Accordingly, Halphen's theory of "unreasonably dangerous per se" is revived. 9
Under the "unreasonably dangerous per se" theory, "liability may be
imposed solely on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of the product
irrespective of the manufacturer's intent, knowledge or conduct." 98 In simpler
terms, the Halphen court established that a manufacturer will be held liable for
the injuries caused by its product whenever the danger-in-fact of the product,
whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product. The effect of
this holding affects products liability actions outside asbestosis litigation. This
high standard of liability, paired with the exposure theory, builds a much stronger
case for the smoker who has developed cancer and has filed suit against the
cigarette or tobacco product manufacturer.
Suits against tobacco product manufacturers by smokers who have developed
cancer are not new. The cancerous damage caused by smoking is a result of
long-term exposure and development," much like asbestosis. As such, these
cases fit neatly within a Cole-Champagne exposure analogy.
The holdings of Cole and Champagne, coupled with recent holdings of the
United States and the Louisiana Supreme Court, illustrate this point. In
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.," ° the United States Supreme Court addressed
whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965'0' and the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 196902 preempted products liability
suits in state courts against tobacco product manufacturers. The Cipollone court
found that the federal legislation did preempt state claims based on a failure to
warn, but that actions based on other theories of liability were still available.
Thus, a suit based on the "unreasonably dangerous per se" theory of liability
03
should survive Cipollone'
The second case of importance is Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co..'04 In
Gilboy, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Louisiana Products Liability
Act does not apply retroactively. Because of this holding and Cole's holding that
the injury occurs at exposure, courts will be bound to apply pre-Act Halphen
products liability law to cases in which the plaintiff began smoking prior to the
enactment of the Louisiana Products Liability Act.
The result should be that a plaintiff in a smoker case need only prove that
the tobacco product fits within the concept of "unreasonably dangerous per se,"

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
Product
(1993).
104.

484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
Id. at 113-14.
Id.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 1963).
112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988)).
Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988)).
For an excellent explanation of the holding in Cipollone, see Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.,
Liability-Cigarettes and Cipollone: What's Left? What's Gone?. 53 La. L. Rev. 713
582 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1991).
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that he was exposed to such product, and that he has sustained damage.
Although in Gilboy the court stated that the jury decides whether a tobacco
product is "unreasonably dangerous per se," Justice Watson's opinion strongly
hinted at what the court's position is by stating, "Since normal use of cigarettes
causes lung cancer, the risk from smoking cigarettes is enormous, while its utility
is virtually nil."' 5
Nonetheless, once these elements are established, the plaintiff is not likely
to encounter many defenses that are able to overcome the high standard of
liability imposed. The most likely defense to be raised by the tobacco
manufacturers will be something similar to contributory negligence under the law
of comparative fault. This defense was held to apply to some strict products
liability cases in Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast.'°6 Applied in the context of the
smoker cases, this defense appears to have merit. Warnings which state the
possibility that tobacco products can cause cancer have been in existence for
some time. Nonetheless, comparative negligence in products liability will reduce
an award only by the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiffs, leaving the
remainder of the award to be paid by the manufacturer. Because the product at
issue will be labeled "unreasonably dangerous per se," thereby triggering the
purest form of strict liability, it seems doubtful that a court would allocate one
hundred percent of the fault to the injured plaintiff.
That tobacco products are addictive may also weaken any argument that the
plaintiff's own negligence should reduce the amount of recovery. Could this
characteristic serve to vitiate all allocation of fault to the plaintiff? Comparative
fault applies to strict products liability in only some cases,0 7 and an argument
can be made that the addicted plaintiff is exempt because he is not truly in
control of his behavior. Moreover, the supreme court stipulated that comparative
fault will apply to strict liability cases where the threat of a reduction in recovery
based upon the plaintiff's own fault will serve to encourage safer use of the
products.'0 8 Again, given that there is no "safer" way to use tobacco products,
it would seem that these smoker cases do not even fit within the purview of
those strict products liability cases in which comparative fault is a defense. Such
arguments insure, at the least, a nominal allocation of fault to the stricken
smoker.
The adoption of the exposure theory is a fair judicial solution to the asbestos
personal injury problem. However, applied to smoker litigation, it may result in
much more long-term latency disease litigation in the Louisiana courts.
Moreover, Cole and Gilboy may allow smokers, who arguably injured themselves, to circumvent the Louisiana Products Liability Act and find relief in preAct jurisprudence.'19

105.

Id. at 1264.
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109.

462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
Id. at 171.
Id.
For a scholarly analysis of the present status of tobacco litigation in Louisiana, see William
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IV. STACKING OF INSURANCE

Another issue decided by the court in Cole and Champagne was the
horizontal stacking of separate insurance policies. "Stacking is the aggregation
of all available coverages in order to create a greater'pool from which the
insured my [sic] be compensated for his or her loss, a result that is favored under
general principles of insurance law.""
The supreme court allowed the
plaintiffs to stack available policies issued over the years because stacking
provided the greatest amount of coverage and was most compatible with the
intent of the contracting parties."' This concept of stacking is not new to
Louisiana jurisprudence," 2 and recognition of the same is but a clarification
of the law.
The policy of stacking seems fitting when it is understood that each exposure
is an injury that, upon manifestation, will give rise to a separate cause of action.
Because the trigger is exposure, the exposures occurring during different policy
periods must trigger distinct policies. To find otherwise would again overlook
the obvious intent of the manufacturer-insured-that its coverage mirrors its
liability.' 3
This holding, allowing the horizontal stacking of insurance policies so as to
cover fully the plaintiff's injuries, is supported by the general trend in insurance
law.'
More importantly, stacking appears compatible with the principles
behind the exposure theory, which now applies in Louisiana. To hold otherwise
would be to overlook both the true intent of the parties and the established policy
of favoring coverage.
V. CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE REGULATION

Every month approximately 2,000 new asbestos related lawsuits are
filed." 5 At present, over 130,000 asbestos suits are pending." 6 Estimates
of substantial exposures across the country range from four to seventy. million." 7 Predictions range as high as 265,000 asbestos related deaths by the

E. Crawford & David J. Shelby, II, Torts Developments in the Law, 1991-1992, 53 La. L. Rev. 1011
(1993).
110. Dennis, supra note 45, at 6.
111. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1080 (La. 1992).
112. See Ducre v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 645 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. La. 1986), aff'd, 833
F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1987); Houston v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 506 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 4th Cir.,
writ denied, 512 So. 2d 460 (1987).
113. See generally 15A Couch on Insurance 2d, § 56:34 (1983).
114. Dennis, supra note 45.
115. Robert A. Dimling, Asbestos and the Insurer as Lender, Employer and Property Owner,
1988 A.B.A. Comm. On Life Ins. L., Health Ins. L., Employee Benefits Rep. 1.
116. Solomon, supra note 33.
117. D.E. Lilienfield et al., Projection ofAsbestos Related Diseases in the United States, 19852009, 45 Brit. J. Indus. Med. 283, 285-86 (1988).
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year 2015.18 At this rate, the result may be that each manufacturer, and many
insurers of those manufacturers, will follow manufacturers such as JohnsManville, Amatex, UNARCO, Eagle-Picher, Raymark, and Celotex, down the
path of bankruptcy.119 If indeed the insurers follow the manufacturers into
bankruptcy, then eventually injured persons will not be compensated for their
asbestos related injuries.
These problems could be solved by government regulation. The government
has previously intervened in similar situations when public concern warranted
legislative action. Creation of the Black Lung Fund is one example.2 After
medical evidence established that long-term employment in coal mines resulted
in deadly health hazards, the federal government established the Black Lung
Fund in an effort to protect the coal industry from financial ruin, as well as to
guarantee future compensation to the diseased miners and their dependents.' 2'
Another example is found in the Louisiana legislature's passage of Act 808
of 1975, which establishes a three-year limitations period for medical malpractice
actions, regardless of the discoverability of the injury. 22 Still another example
is identified in the Illinois legislature's passage of the Workers' Occupational
Diseases Act, 23 which imposes a similar three-year limitations period on
asbestos claims. 124 These examples demonstrate that the proposed idea is
neither new nor untested.
Without legislative regulation, the growth of asbestosis litigation threatens
the entire judicial process in this area. According to one commentator, "the only
real beneficiaries of this system are the lawyers on both sides who litigate these
claims."' 25 For every dollar a plaintiff receives, litigation and insurance costs
are estimated to be $2.71.126 One manufacturer, prior to filing for bankruptcy,
was spending 2.5 million dollars a month in attorneys' fees alone, while another
paid 6.3 million
dollars in litigation costs in its final year before filing for
27
bankruptcy.'

118. Steve Baughman, Class Actions in the Asbestos Context: Balancing the Due Process
Considerations Implicated By the Right to Opt Out, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 212 (1991).
119. Solomon, supra note 33.
120. Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-962 (1986).
121. As announced in the Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969:
It is, therefore, the purpose of this subchapter to provide benefits, in cooperation with the
States, to coal miners who are totally disabled ...and to the surviving dependents of
miners whose death was due to such disease; and to insure that in the future adequate
benefits are provided to coal miners and their dependents in the event of their death or
total disability due to pneumoconiosis.
122. See supra text accompanying note 32 (regarding the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act).
123. 820 ILCS 310/1 (Smith-Hurd Ann. 1993).
124. See supra text accompanying note 36 (regarding Illinois prescriptive statute for asbestos
litigation).
125. Schuck, supra note 35, at 553.
126. Hagan, supra note 86, at 13.
127. Id.
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The American Bar Association has also recognized the shortcomings of
judicial solutions to asbestosis litigation.2 Recognizing that such cases simply
are not amenable to different applications in each state, the ABA has petitioned
Congress to intervene. 2 9 Perhaps even more significant are the many proposals that have come before Congress specifically calling for some type of regulation. 3 ° These bills suggest establishing a fund that would serve to compensate
3
the injured parties without the necessity of prolonged, expensive litigation. '
Of these proposals, Representative Fenwick's bill of 1978 may be the best
approach because it provides that the other parties involved in the supply and
distribution of asbestos share in the responsibility, including the United States
government. Manufacturers and their respective insurers are presently carrying
the entire weight of the asbestos crisis, but they are not the only responsible
parties. That asbestos represented a health hazard was generally known as far
back as the 1930s,13 1 yet the United States government continued to use
asbestos extensively in the manufacture of its warships throughout World War
II and military specifications mandated inclusion of asbestos in products sold to
the government until 1976.133 As stated by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals during the litigation of the Agent Orange class action, "It would be
anomalous for a company to be held liable by a state or federal court for selling
a product ordered by the federal government ....,134
Despite the government's complicity, the attempt by one manufacturer to
third-party the United States government demonstrates the characteristic futility
of suing an unwilling sovereign.' 35 Taking all of this into account, Representative Fenwick's bill provides that the federal government would also contribute
to the compensation fund. Moreover, the proposal requires contribution from
asbestos miners as well as suppliers who continued to supply asbestos long after
its detrimental effects were made known. Present litigation has allowed these
other participants to escape unscathed, while an entire manufacturing industry
heads toward bankruptcy.
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NOTES
VI. CONCLUSION

Cole and Champagne provide all the right answers. The opinions are based
on authoritative reasoning and sound civilian theory. The decisions represent the
most equitable holdings that a judicial body could make. However, although the
Louisiana Supreme Court's answers are correct, the social problem remains
unsolved. Continuing to subject asbestosis cases to jurisprudential tort law will
only force the remaining asbestos manufacturers into bankruptcy. At that point,
the plaintiffs in these cases will simply sue new parties involved in the asbestos
chain. Instead of witnessing a reduction in the number of asbestos personal
injury cases filed, the judicial process will slow down as courts attempt to
resolve the new issues created by this new twist. The movement for regulation
is not new. The subject has been urged by many legislators and commentators
who recognize both the present and future injustice caused by judicially resolving
asbestos related disputes. Regulation by way of a public fund, financed by all
liable parties, is needed before an entire manufacturing industry is in bankruptcy
and asbestos victims are left uncompensated.
George Robertson Murphy, III

